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ABSTRACT: The originality of Foucault’s work lies in part in how he reverses the question of 
power, asking not how power is held and imposed, but how it is produced. In both his discussion 
of sovereignty and governmentality, though, Foucault skips over the res publica; a form of political 
organization that fits neither Foucault’s characterization of sovereignty nor the care of the self. I 
extend Foucault’s discussion to identify a ratio of government around the discipline of ownership 
by which the res publica was made intelligible, its relations understood, and its logic organized. I 
end by suggesting some implications for neo-Roman interpretations of liberty as non-domination. 
 
Keywords: Res publica, sovereignty, governmentality, liberty, neo-Romanism 
 
Introduction  
This essay proceeds from my interest in exploring the complex power relations of Roman politics. 
I have sought elsewhere to try to separate Roman power relations from what Foucault calls the 
“mythology of the sovereign,” which he describes as “the great trap” that has led scholars to view 
politics through the lens of power operating on subjects.2 The originality of Foucault’s work lies in 
                                                 
1 My thanks to Michèle Lowrie, Michael Kicey, Kerry Whiteside, Richard Alston and Shreyaa Bhatt for their 
helpful comments. 
2 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon 
(New York: Pantheon, 1980), 39: mythology; Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1975-76, edited by M. Bertani, A. Fontana, F. Ewald and D. Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 34: trap. 
There have been a number of approaches that seek to identify the operation of sovereignty in Roman politics. 
Sovereignty as embedded in law (constitutional state): Theodor Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, edited by K.J. 
Marquardt (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1887-1888), 3/1, 127-42, 300-68; 3/2, 1030; M. P. Nilsson, "The Introduction of 
Hoplite Tactics at Rome: Its Date and Its Consequences" in The Journal of Roman Studies 19 (1929): 1-11, here 7; 
Chaim Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1950), 17-18 (https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511518607); Lily Ross Taylor, The 
Voting Districts of the Roman Republic: The Thirty-five Urban and Rural Tribes (Rome: American Academy in Rome, 
 




part in how he reverses the question of power, asking not how power is held and imposed, but 
how it is produced. In his own writings and lectures, Foucault has sought to free the study of 
power from laws and institutions, viewing power as something that “passes through individuals” 
and is “not applied to them.”3 
 
Although Foucault’s focus is on modern discourses of power, the ancient world figures in his 
work in two ways. First, in his efforts to displace the centrality of sovereignty for understanding 
power, Foucault identifies a break between modern disciplinary practices and a medieval dis-
course of sovereignty that he sees as extending back to the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. Fou-
cault locates in modernity the operation of multiple sites of subjugation (as both the forming and 
disciplining of subjects) that he contrasts with an ancient historiography that forged the connec-
tion between men of power, the continuity of law, and the luster of force. Second, as Foucault ad-
dressed more specifically the connection between freedom and subjectivity, he turned to ancient 
ethics. Foucault associates the Hellenistic and Roman care of the self that connected the govern-
ment of oneself to the government of others with the changing political cues that attended the 
decline of the city-state and the rise of Empire, whose political organization Foucault tends to as-
sociate with the Principate.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
1960) 17; P. A. Brunt, "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution" in The Journal of Roman Studies 52 
(1962): 69-86, here 76; P. A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press,1988), 345; Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 
169; Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 39-43; K. A. 
Raaflaub, The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 266; Caroline 
Williamson, The Laws of the Roman People: Public Law in the Expansion and Decline of the Roman Republic (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 95 (https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.15992); Fergus Millar, The 
Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1998), 3-4 
(https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.15678); Benjamin Straumann, "Constitutional Thought in the Late Roman 
Republic" in History of Political Thought 32 (2) (2011): 280-292, here 285-86; Sovereignty as domination: Coleman 
Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome. 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1911), 1.112-
13, 1.295-96, 1.411-13; Andrew Alföldi, "Hasta-Summa Imperii: The Spear as Embodiment of Sovereignty in Rome" 
in American Journal of Archaeology 63 (1) (1959): 1-27, here 3; Alan Watson, International Law in Archaic Rome: War 
and Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 10-37, 42; D. J. Bederman, International Law in 
Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 42-43, 46-47, 76-79, 192-93, 274-75; Clifford Ando, 
"Aliens, Ambassadors, and the Integrity of the Empire" in Law and History Review 26 (3) (2008): 491-519, here 494, 
499-500; Clifford Ando, Law, Language, and Empire in the Roman Tradition (Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 65, 72-73, 79; Valentina Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman 
Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 142 fn 299; Melissa Lane, The Birth of Politics: Eight 
Greek and Roman Political Ideas and Why They Matter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 289. Popular 
sovereignty: Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 43, 200. Sovereignty as exception: Giorgio 
Agamben, State of Exception, translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 41, 50-51. 
3 Foucault, Society, 29; also Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78 
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 118. 
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Between the city-state and the “Imperial epoch” stands the res publica, a political form that Fou-
cault largely skips over, yet one the Romans themselves distinguished from Hellenistic monar-
chies and the Principate.4 The res publica fits neither Foucault’s characterization of sovereignty nor 
the care of the self. There is not the coincidence of sovereignty and power that Foucault associates 
with ancient politics. Nor is there the loss of traditional bearings — the “political structures of the 
city and the laws” — by which individuals oriented themselves politically.5 That is, if one view of 
the operation of power in the res publica suggests too unified a framework of state sovereignty, the 
other sees it as too diffuse, locating it in a sovereignty “that one exercises over the self.”6 The re-
sult is a misreading of the operation of power.  
 
It is by way of Foucault, though, that I want to reconstruct the political framework that organizes 
the space of the res publica; not from its institutional forms, but from the logic by which relations 
of power were understood and organized. I turn first to Foucault’s discussion of Rome. My goal is 
to both acquaint the reader with Foucault’s different forays into the Roman world and provide a 
vocabulary of analysis. In the second section, I extend Foucault to identify a ratio of government 
around the disciplinary practices of ownership by which the res publica was made intelligible, its 
logic organized, its relations understood, and forms of domination normalized. I end by suggest-
ing some implications for neo-Roman interpretations of republican liberty as non-domination. 
 
Foucault and Rome 
Although Foucault often turned to ancient Rome, particularly in his later work, it is less clear 
where the Republic fits into his discussion of power. At times, Foucault seems to include Rome in 
a continuous discourse of sovereignty that extends to the Middle Ages. The ancient and medieval 
writing of history, as Foucault writes, was “a ritual that reinforced sovereignty.”7 Although what 
Foucault means by sovereignty is never fully developed, in this context he characterizes sover-
eignty as binding “everything together into a unity.”8 As Foucault writes, “from the first Roman 
annalists until the late Middle Ages,” the function of history was “to speak the right of power and 
                                                 
4 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Vol. 3. The Care of the Self, 1st Vintage Books edition (New York, 1988), 
85.  
5 Ibid., 89. 
6 Ibid., 85. 
7 Foucault, Society, 69. 
8 Ibid., 69. Foucault also associates sovereignty with the right to punish, which derives from the right to make 
war on enemies; a power Foucault associates with the Roman merum imperium (Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1979), 48. And he associates sovereignty with the power to 
suspend law, which is superseded by disciplinary power (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 53; also Foucault 
Power/Knowledge, 39). 




to intensify the luster of power.”9 History, as written by the men of power, reinforces sovereignty 
by showing both continuity and unity to power.10 It demonstrates “the continuity of the law” by 
establishing “a juridical link between those men and power.”11 And it functions to “intensify the 
luster of force” through exempla.12 This Jupiterian history, as Foucault refers to it (drawing on 
Dumézil), accomplishes this by combining a “juridical aspect” in which “power uses obligations, 
oaths, commitments, and the law to bind” with a “magical function, role, and efficacy” in which 
“power dazzles, and power petrifies.”13 This Roman discourse, meant to promote unity and glory, 
is then later brought into tension with what emerges as a more dominant discourse of what Fou-
cault names (somewhat uncomfortably) race struggle; a discourse meant to illuminate something 
that was hidden.14 The tension is between Rome and Jerusalem, that is, between “the Roman his-
tory of sovereignty” and “the biblical history of servitude and exiles.”15  
 
However, there is no easily identified unity between men in power, sovereignty, and majesty. 
There is no doubt that the histories of Rome, especially the ones we have now, are focused on, 
and ratify the power of, the leading men. But even that is complicated. Historians such as Livy 
did not depict a history of unity and glory, but pointed to the conflict and divisions by which 
both power and law were contested, used and misused. Lost, also, are histories, such as Sallust’s 
and Gaius Lucinius Macer’s, that locate power in the populus Romanus.16 Moreover, the magical 
elements of history — the luster of force — is attributed frequently to the majesty of the people: 
the maiestas populi Romani.17 Even for early modern Romanists, the Romans were a ready source of 
disruption against a sovereign, centralizing power, as Hobbes attests (Leviathan, 2.21, 29). There is 
an irony here that underlies the analytic problem: While seeking to free the study of power from 
                                                 
9 Foucault, Society, 66. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 67; also 66: “The yoke of the law and the luster of glory appear to me to be the two things historical dis-
course strives to use to reinforce power.” 
13 Ibid., 68. See Georges Dumézil, Mitra-Varuna: An Essay on Two Indo-European Representations of Sovereignty. 2nd 
edition (New York: Zone Books, 1988). 
14 Foucault, Society, 72-74. See Andrew W. Neal, "Cutting Off the King's Head: Foucault's Society Must Be 
Defended and the Problem of Sovereignty" in Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29 (4) (2004): 373-398 
(https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540402900401).  
15 Foucault, Society, 77. 
16 On recovering this populares tradition, see Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics. 
17 See Hammer, “Between Sovereignty and Non-Sovereignty: Maiestas and Foundational Authority in the Roman 
Republic,” Paper to be presented at the Institute of Classical Studies (forthcoming). Different arguments are 
made by Richard A. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate. 
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1967), J.-L. Ferrary, "Les origines de la loi de majesté à Rome." 
Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1983): 556-572, Yan Thomas, "L’institution 
de la Majesté" in Revue de synthèse 112 (3-4) (1991): 331-386 and Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics. 
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the grip of sovereignty, Foucault ends up reading the Romans by way of a medieval history of 
sovereignty. Although conceptions of sovereignty drew on interpretations of Roman law, it is 
important to recognize that sovereignty is an early modern term and discourse that arises out of 
distinct historical circumstances and addresses a set of concerns tied to the emergence of the 
modern state.18 In short, reading Roman historiography as a discourse of sovereignty leads us to 
seek a unified power where there may be none.  
 
Foucault at other times sees in Roman society, particularly under the Principate, something of a 
corollary to modern society. Foucault argues for the need to reorient the study of the modern op-
eration of power from “the juridical edifice of sovereignty, State apparatuses, and the ideologies 
that accompany them” to “material operations, forms of subjugation, and the connections among 
and the uses made of the local systems of subjugation on the one hand, and apparatuses of 
knowledge on the other.”19 As Foucault writes, in suggesting the move from sovereignty as im-
posing law on men to government employing tactics:  
 
Whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and gets its instruments from itself in the 
form of law, the end of government is internal to the things it directs (diriger); it is to be sought 
in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs, and the instru-
ments of government will become diverse tactics rather than laws.20  
 
The context for this statement is Foucault’s discussion of a new mechanism of power, “discipli-
nary power,” that is exercised on bodies and what they do rather than the land and what it pro-
duces.21 In his lectures the following year, Foucault would further elaborate what he describes as 
“the breakthrough” of a “governmental ratio” or “governmental reason” in which the state serves 
as “the principle of intelligibility” or “schema of intelligibility”: “a way of thinking the specific 
nature, connections, and relations of certain already given elements and institutions. What is a 
                                                 
18 See Quentin Skinner, "Political Philosophy" in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, edited by C.B. 
Schmitt, Q. Skinner and E. Kessler, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 389-452, here 392-93; 
Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics. Vol. 2: Renaissance Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14-
15; Quentin Skinner, "The Sovereign State: A Genealogy" in Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future 
of a Contested Concept, edited by H. Kalmo and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26-46; 
Alexander P. d'Entrèves, The Notion of the State: An Introduction to Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1967); Martin Loughlin, "Ten Tenets of Sovereignty" in Sovereignty in Transition: Essays in European Law, edited by 
N. Walker (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), 55-86 on the early modern discourse of sovereignty.  
19 Foucault, Society, 34; also 46: “Rather than looking at the three prerequisites of law, unity, and subject — which 
makes sovereignty both the source of power and the basis of institutions — I think we have to adopt the three-
fold point of view of the techniques, the heterogeneity of techniques, and the subjugation effects that make tech-
nologies of domination the real fabric of both power relations and the great apparatuses of power.” 
20 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 99. 
21 Foucault, Society, 36. 




king? What is a sovereign? What is a magistrate? What is a constituted body? What is a law? 
What is a territory?”22 Sovereignty emerges not as one edifice, “but the multiple subjugations that 
take place and function within the social body,” and a network of discipline and punishment that 
culminates in the modern era as a carceral society.23 Foucault situates this new version of sover-
eignty in this connection of “government of oneself and government of others,” referring to this 
operation of power as governmentality.24  
 
Governmentality, at least in its initial formulation by Foucault, is focused on modern technologies 
of administering populations. That is, the sovereign power is replaced by a disciplinary power in 
which life is “the new object of power.”25 But he broadens the analysis when he turns to ancient 
ethics, looking specifically at the roots of forms of governmentality in ancient times: the Platonic 
model of recollection; the Hellenistic model of conversion to the self; and the Christian model of 
exegesis or uncovering the self.26 In classical times:  
 
the object of care was indeed the self, but in which the end of the care of the self was the city-
state, in which the self reappears, but merely as a part. The city-state mediated the relationship 
of self to self so that the self could be the object as well as the end, but the self was only the end 
because it was mediated by the city-state.27  
 
That is, care of the self involved initially the question of “what basis and within what limits 
should the subject submit to the law.”28  
 
With Imperial Rome, though, Foucault argues that one sees emerge a later relationship to the self 
as one of mastery and sovereignty.29 Foucault characterizes the central political problem of the 
Roman world as the question of the type of political unit that will be organized when the exercise 
                                                 
22 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 285-87; also Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in Critical 
Inquiry 8 (4) (1982): 777-795, here 779-80. 
23 Foucault, Society, 27; also 28: “rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we 
should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are 
gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as the subject.” See Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, 298-308 on the carceral society. 
24 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982. 1st edition (New 
York: Picador, 2005), 374, 377-78.  
25 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, translated by S. Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 92; also 
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 108-9. 
26 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 264. 
27 Ibid., 83. 
28 Ibid., 318. 
29 Ibid., 86. 
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of power must extend beyond the boundaries of city.30 Foucault is careful to avoid the simple 
equation of the “decline of the city-state” that begins in the third century BCE with a retreat into 
the self, identifying instead a change “in the conditions of the exercise of power.”31 As Foucault 
writes, “Rather than imagining a reduction or cessation of political activities through the effect of 
a centralized imperialism, one should think in terms of the organization of a complex space.”32 
The space is not highly bureaucratized; rather, it was “a space in which the centers of power were 
multiple; in which the activities, the tensions, the conflicts were numerous.”33 With “a weakening 
of the political and social framework within which the lives of individuals used to unfold” comes 
an intensification of the care of the self.34 One sees portrayed through Roman exempla not “visible 
forms of brilliance and power, but individual forms of self-mastery.”35  
 
Like in his discussion of sovereignty, so in his extension of governmentality Foucault draws his 
examples largely from the Principate: either as advice about how to conduct oneself as a member 
of the “service aristocracy” in carrying out rules in a large network of management and admin-
istration, or advice to the figure of the princeps, who was accountable to no one. In both cases, rul-
ing others requires (and is coextensive with) ruling oneself.36 But how does this self-mastery func-
tion in the framework of the res publica? Foucault gives us some sense of how this plays out in the 
Roman Republic in a brief mention of Cato the Elder, the late third and early second century BCE 
senator and historian, in which the body, the household, and love are all seen as domains “in 
which the practice of the self is actualized.”37  
 
I want to start from Foucault’s example, using Cato the Elder’s manual on agriculture as a begin-
ning point for identifying less a care of the self and more a reason of government by which the 
Republic was made intelligible, certain kinds of knowledge validated, and relations of power un-
derstood. I am both arguing against the attempt by Foucault to embed the operation of power of 
the res publica in sovereignty and extending Foucault’s notion of governmentality to explore the 
cultural discourse by which disciplinary forms take shape. My argument proceeds by exploring 
discourses of ownership, beginning with Cato’s and Varro’s handbooks on agriculture, which 
emerge as practices of discipline both for the farm and the farmer. I look next at how these house-
                                                 
30 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982-1983, translated by 
Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 290; Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 375. 
31 Foucault, The Care of the Self, 81, 83. 
32 Ibid., 82. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 41; see Dean Hammer, Roman Political Thought and the Modern Theoretical Imagination (Norman, 2008), 180-
222 (https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139031073).  
35 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 264. 
36 Foucault, The Care of the Self, 84. 
37 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 161; also 160, 264. 




hold practices are extended to politics, not just as the characteristics of a good citizen, but also as a 
way of understanding the res publica as a form of ownership, as a partnership (societas). There is a 
close analogy to the household; in Roman law, there is a provision for managing the household 
when the pater is absent. But the absence of the pater, like the absence of the king, raises a ques-
tion: How does the hierarchy work?  
 
The question of hierarchy is not one usually associated with discussions of ownership. The politi-
cal dimension of ownership has often been read by way of a dichotomy between owning and be-
ing owned, or between being free and being a slave. That is, ownership is frequently seen as the 
basis by which the Romans conceived of libertas. Neo-Roman interpretations (to which I will re-
turn in the final section) take the claim even further, suggesting that underlying this conception of 
libertas is a notion of non-domination. But much less attention has been given to unpacking how 
power is conceived within the image of ownership. I will argue by way of Foucault that in explor-
ing the layered images of ownership, one actually gains insight into the operation of power; not 
as embedded in sovereignty (as Foucault suggests) but in a cultural discourse that defines equali-
ty, consent, reason, and trust in ways that normalize forms of domination.  
 
Res publica and the ratio of government 
Where “sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the major problem of the seat of government,” 
Foucault argues, “discipline structures a space and addresses the essential problem of a hierar-
chical and functional distribution of elements.”38 These disciplinary forms “take shape within 
quite distinct practices, institutions, and groups” in which values are conditioned on “more or 
less regular techniques and procedures that have been developed, validated, transmitted, and 
taught, and that are also associated with a whole set of notions, concepts, and theories etcetera; 
with a field of knowledge (savoir).”39 Unlike violence, which is direct action on another, the type 
of power Foucault is exploring refers to action on the action of others.40 It is this ability to affect 
and direct the conduct of others, or “the possible field of actions of others,” that Foucault refers to 
as government.41 For Foucault, the analysis of governmental power is not confined to institutions 
but involves an attention to how power applies itself “to immediate everyday life which catego-
rizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, im-
poses a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in 
him.”42 This attention directs Foucault to a variety of texts that are not just explicit theorizations of 
                                                 
38 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 20. 
39 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 113, 179. 
40 Foucault, The Subject and Power, 789. See also Hannah Arendt, "On Violence" in Hannah Arendt, Crises of the 
Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 105-84 on the distinction between violence and power. 
41 Foucault, The Subject and Power, 790. 
42 Ibid., 781. 
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power, but their practices: factory and prison floor plans, demographic analyses, health reports, 
and accounting, to name a few. I will look first at the discipline of owning that emerges from 
these handbooks, showing then how this discipline of owning is extended to conceptualizations 
of political relations. 
 
The discipline of owning 
We can understand Cato the Elder’s handbook on farming as a regimen of everyday life that con-
trols activity by classifying, categorizing, ranking, and organizing multiplicity. As Foucault 
writes, “the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierar-
chical. They are spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out indi-
vidual segments and establish operation links; they mark places and indicate values; they guaran-
tee the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and gesture.”43 Discipline is 
not limited to particular, discrete practices, but forms the actions and attitude of the body.  
 
When Cato the Elder writes in his manual on agriculture, “Remember that a farm is like a man,” 
he is making a claim about a relationship between the res rustica and individual and social forms 
of conduct (Cato the Elder, De agricultura, 1.6; also pro.1).44 A farm needs a master in order to 
manage the possessions (Cato the Elder, De agricultura, 2.1) and to assign different responsibilities 
(5.1-8; 10.1; 11.1; 14.1; 66.1; 67.1-2; 136.1: tenant; 142.1; 143.1-3; 144.1-5). Mastery relies on 
knowledge that recognizes the importance of distinctions: climate, soil, plantings, buildings, and 
job functions. And this knowledge is associated with discipline: training vines (32.1; 33.1), build-
ing orderly furrows (41.2), organizing and controlling slaves (2.7), and observing proper rituals 
(83.1; 131.1; 132.1-2; 134.1-4; 139.1; 140.1; 141.1-4). These disciplinary practices all have their corol-
laries in the management of time (2.1-8) and money (1.6; 2.7; 4.1), patience (3.1), attentiveness 
(4.1), productivity (2.1-8; 37.3; 39.1-2; 40.1), proper conduct (4.1; 143.1), piety (83.1), and neighbor-
liness (4.1). The manual reads as a compendium of what every Roman should know and be: mod-
erate (1.6), attentive (2.1-7), active (3.1), judicious (5.1-2), and skilled in crafts (135.1-3), encom-
passing everything from farming practice to religious observation to bodily cures. The suggestion 
is that the disciplinary practices of the good farmer form the good citizen. It is from the farmer, as 
Cato writes, “that the bravest men and the sturdiest soldiers come” (pro.4; also pro.2 and Varro 
De re rustica, 3.1.4-5: most pious and useful, only survivors of King Saturnus; in contrast, Cicero 
De republica, 2.4.7-8: temptations of trade).  
 
                                                 
43 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 148. Foucault would compare Seneca’s language of the examination of the self 
to “that of a master of a household checking his accounts” (Foucault, The Care of the Self, 61). 
44 On the connection of agriculture to Roman identity, see Mary Jaeger, "Agriculture and Identity in Roman 
Myth" in A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic, edited by Dean Hammer, (Oxford and Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 83-98. 




This science (scientia) of cultivation is seen as organizing Roman spaces as well (Varro, De re rusti-
ca, 1.2.3-8). Varro, in his handbook, describes (by way of Agrasius) how in all his travels he has 
never “seen any land more fully cultivated than Italy,” not only because of the superior land and 
climate, but also because of laws (such as limits on landholding) that make the land productive 
rather than extravagant (1.2.3; 1.2.9-10). Esteem is awarded to diligence (1.2.9-10). And Varro con-
nects this image of the farm not just to the citizen, but to their political location. He recalls Gaius 
Licinius, who, as tribune of the plebs, “was the first to lead the people, for the hearing of laws, 
from the comitium into the ‘farm’ (in septem iugera) of the forum” (Varro, De re rustica, 1.2.9; Cicero, 
De republica, 2.14.26). The language is layered: preceding this statement is a reference to Gaius 
Licinius’ ancestors who had originated the bill limiting Roman citizens from holding more land 
than 500 iugura, which was meant to control extravagance. Licinius is praised because of the con-
tinuity with his ancestors in managing the estate. But that management is extended into the polit-
ical realm. Licinius is the first to lead citizens into the forum; the seven iugura recalling the modest 
amount of land assigned each citizen after the expulsion of the kings (see Pliny, Naturalis Historia, 
18.3.18). These are claims about the science of space, about what counts as the profitable and 
proper arrangement of space for those who cultivate (colere) rather than philosophize (Varro, De 
re rustica, 1.5.2). Time is parceled as well. The calendar is created so that those in the country 
could attend to town affairs on the ninth days, the remaining days spent cultivating their farms 
(2.pro.1-2; 2.pro.3: now corrupted by leisure and entertainment; 2.pro.4-5: farms converted to 
grazing; also Cicero, De republica, 2.4.7-8: indolence and extravagance with trade rather than 
farms).  
 
The knowledge of nature in the ancient world, as Foucault writes, served not as a means of de-
tachment from one’s environment, but as a way of grasping its details and organization in order 
to see oneself as a part.45 Certainly reasoning from nature looms large in Roman political thought 
as a framework for structuring political ideas, perhaps most explicitly developed during the Re-
public in Cicero’s De legibus. But in these handbooks on agriculture, one gets an insight into how 
forms of knowledge of nature normalize particular disciplinary practices and relations; practices 
that do not diminish different forces, but rather, as Foucault notes, “[seek] to bind them together 
in such a way as to multiply and use them.”46 These practices more closely resemble what Scipio 
extols as the primary form of Roman training, namely that which occurs by experience and max-
ims learned at home (Cicero, De republica, 1.22.36). 
 
Discipline, ownership and politics 
Like the practices of farming, Cicero undertakes a study of “the ratio of government and the train-
ing of peoples” (ratio civilis et disciplina populorum) (Cicero, De republica, 3.3.4; also 1.2.2; 1.6.11). 
                                                 
45 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 281-83. 
46 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 170. 
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Just as Cato and Varro delineate different crops for different soils, so Cicero celebrates Romulus 
for wisely selecting where “to plant (serere) a res publica” (De republica, 2.3.5; also 1.26.41: seeds of 
state). The character of Scipio in Cicero’s De republica suggests not only how this discipline is read 
into politics, but also how seamlessly discipline in one sphere affects all spheres: When a democ-
racy “destroy[s] all distinction between a private citizen and a magistrate,” it necessarily follows 
in such a State that liberty prevails everywhere, to such an extent that not only are homes one and 
all without a master, but the vice of anarchy extends even to the domestic animals, until finally 
the father fears his son, the son flouts his father, all sense of shame disappears, and all is so abso-
lutely free that there is no distinction between citizen and alien; the schoolmaster fears and flat-
ters his pupils, and pupils despise their masters; youth take on the gravity of age, and old men 
stoop to the games of youth, for fear they may be disliked by their juniors and seem to them too 
serious. Under such conditions even the slaves come to behave with unseemly freedom, wives 
have the same rights as their husbands, and in the abundance of liberty even the dogs, the horses, 
and the asses are so free in their running about that men must make way for them in the streets 
(Cicero, De republica, 1.43.67; also De legibus, 3.9.19: lowest equal to the highest).47  
 
The result, Scipio concludes, is that authority is so reviled that citizens “begin to neglect the laws 
as well, and so finally are utterly without a master of any kind” (Cicero, De republica, 1.43.67). The 
diatribe reads as a veritable compendium of what Cicero later describes as distinctions between 
“different kinds of domination and subjection” (imperandi et serviendi) (De republica, 3.25.37).  
 
It is in the context of ownership that Cicero provides a genealogy of the early Roman community: 
as a large household with a father, extended then to the children who, when mature, comprised 
the senate (De republica, 2.12.23; 2.11.21: raised the people from infancy).48 But a household is not 
the same as a res publica: the concentration of imperium or potestas in one man alters the terms of 
ownership. The king (as father) can command obedience over his property, eliding any difference 
between citizens and slaves (De republica, 3.25.37). For Cicero, political rule is not the same as 
household rule, but it is not a completely separate realm from the management of possessions 
either. The res publica is itself a thing, a possession of the people. In ancient law, “res publicae were 
all things owned by the state.”49 Schofield, in his insightful discussion, argues that for Cicero to be 
free is to possess the res publica, which means that the populus “has rights over its management 
                                                 
47 Reasoning from natural law, Cicero sees an analogous set of relationships that extend to the household: a god 
rules the universe, like a king rules his subjects, like a father rules his children, like the mind governs the body 
(De republica, 3.25.37: sed corpori ut rex civibus suis aut parens liberis); also 1.39.61. 
48 See Dean Hammer, Roman Political Thought: From Cicero to Augustine, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 50-52. Cited hereafter as Roman Political Thought.  
49 Alan Watson, The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 10. 




and use.”50 As I have argued in Roman Political Thought, Cicero conceives of the res publica as a 
particular type of ownership: as a partnership (societas) (De republica, 1.25.39).51 Cicero is employ-
ing not just a common language of association, but one that has a legal denotation: it refers to a 
type of partnership in which, as de Zulueta writes, individuals “contribute property or work or 
both to the prosecution of a common aim” (see, for example, Pro Q. Roscio 8.24; Pro Quinctio 
3.11).52 Like the state that, as Foucault writes, “is the regulatory idea of governmental reason,” so 
the res publica becomes a scheme by which relations of power, notions of agreement, objectives, 
and forms of authority are understood.53 
In a partnership, as treated later by the jurist Gaius, profits and losses must continue to be 
shared, either equally or in proportion to an agreed upon recognition of differences in service or 
other contributions (Gaius, Institutiones, 3.149-50). A partnership requires that the parties remain 
“of the same mind” (in eodem sensu) (Gaius, Institutiones, 3.151). Gaius refers at one point to a type 
of societas called ercto non cito, an “ownership undivided” (Gaius, Institutiones, 3.154a). The part-
nership likely referred to the continuation of the household as it was before the death of the pater-
familias, “except that there were now several persons who had equal right to perform inde-
pendently the acts of administration previously performable only by the deceased or with his au-
thority.”54 The ancient consortium of sui heredes was likely the basis for the classical societas omni-
um bonorum, through which the assets of the socii and future acquisitions were held in common by 
contractual agreement.55 It is changed from something seen as deriving from a pre-existing natu-
ral union (the family) to something artificial and constituted by law, though there is no different 
treatment in their legal effects.56  
I want to suggest how this language of ownership provides a ratio by which differential power 
relations could be understood, organized and validated not only between owning and being 
owned, but also among those who own. I will delineate below how conceiving of the res publica as 
a form of societas structures power by (1) differentiating, (2) establishing the parameters of legiti-
mate action, and (3) defining the proper functioning of the parts.  
                                                 
50 Malcolm Schofield, “Cicero's Definition of Res Publica" in Cicero the Philosopher, edited by J.G.F. Powell (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 63-83, here 76; also Malcolm Schofield, Saving the City: Philosopher-kings and Other 
Classical Paradigms (London: Routledge, 1999), 188-89.  
51 See Hammer, Roman Political Thought, 46-69. 
52 Francis de Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius. 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 2.179. Examples of societates 
include the growth of tax companies (societates publicanorum) (see Andrew Lintott, Imperium Romanum: Politics 
and Administration (London: Routledge, 1993), 86-91). It has been suggested that Quintus Mucius first articulates 
the more abstract notion of societas (Aldo Schiavone, "Classi e politica in una società precapitalistica: il caso della 
Roa repubblicana" in Quaderni di storia 9 (1977): 33-69; Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics, 162-63).  
53 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 286. 
54 Francis de Zulueta, "The New Fragments of Gaius. Part II: Societas ercto non cito" in The Journal of Roman Studies 
25: (1935), 19-32, here 25. 
55 de Zulueta, The New Fragments of Gaius, 25, 30. 
56 Ibid., 20, 30. 
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1. Differentiation. Foucault writes, “Every relationship of power puts into operation differentia-
tions which are at the same time its conditions and its results.”57 A partnership requires fairness 
(for example, De republica, 1.45.69). But fairness (aequabilitas), a term of Cicero’s creation, is not the 
same as strict equality in which distinctions are eliminated (De republica, 1.27.43; 1.34.53; also De 
legibus, 3.9.19).58 What is fair, from the perspective of societas, is negotiated among the partners 
according to the principle of shared contributions and losses. Partners, for example, can entrust 
others, as the people (for Cicero) entrust the aristocracy, to make decisions about certain affairs 
(De republica, 1.34.51). The mixed form of government advocated by Cicero is one way of institu-
tionalizing the differential contributions of societas, one in which “every citizen is firmly estab-
lished in his own station” (De republica, 1.45.69).  
The idea of proportionate responsibilities had long been normalized and institutionalized 
by way of the census. Where the modern census for Foucault is part of a broader concern with the 
administration and care of populations, in Rome the census serves as a form of knowledge that 
organizes society by ranks.59 Livy describes the introduction of the census, dating back to the sixth 
Roman king, Servius, which recognized “distinctions” (discriminis) among citizens that would 
allow burdens of war and peace to be born “in proportion to men’s wealth” (Livy 1.42.4). These 
differential contributions are used, among other ways, to justify the dramatically different 
weighting of a vote. In the comitia centuriata (assembly of centuries), citizens were divided into 193 
units (or centuries) according to the census class (based on wealth). Those with less wealth were 
grouped in larger numbers into particular centuries than those with more, giving disproportion-
ate weight to wealthier classes.60 As Cicero writes, “the greatest number of rules belonged, not to 
the common people, but to the rich” (De republica, 2.22.39; also 2.22.40: votes in hands of those for 
whom welfare of state is most important; also Cicero, De legibus, 3.3.7: censors).  
                                                 
57 Foucault, The Subject and Power, 792. 
58 See Elaine Fantham, "Aequabilitas in Cicero’s Political Theory and the Greek Tradition of Proportional Justice" 
in Classical Quarterly 23 (1973): 285-90, here 287 (https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838800036764).  
59 On the modern administration of populations, see Foucault, Society, 242-47. On disciplinary structures, see 
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 20. Foucault references the organization of the Roman camp as an exer-
cise of discipline through observation (see Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 26 and Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish, 170-72).  
60 See Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiquitates Romanae, 4.19.2-3; 21.2; Cicero, De republica, 2.22.39-40; Livy, Ab 
Urbe Condita, 1.43.10. Distribution of voting: assembly consisted of 193 groups (centuries): wealthy distributed in 
18 groups of knights (equites) (comprised of the senatorial class and a non-senatorial class who owned property 
and would come to form a distinct class and be referred to as the equites), 70 groups of the first class, and joined 
by a group of carpenters; poor distributed in 104 groups (De republica, 2.22.39-40). The two lowest classes were 
grouped into 30 centuriae, and the proletarii into one (Henrik Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman 
Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 94 (https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482885)).  




The organization of space reinforced this differentiation, serving as what Foucault de-
scribes as a mechanism that enforces hierarchy through surveillance.61 The military camp be-
comes “the diagram of power that acts by general visibility”: a square or rectangle divided into 
other squares and rectangles.62 One sees this organization in political spaces. When voting, the 
people were grouped into their centuries or tribes, which corresponded with rank, in front of a 
presiding magistrate, and before the secret ballot their vote would be public.63 In his argument 
against the secret ballot, Cicero made clear the role of this scrutiny: it deprives the elite of influ-
ence by concealing the people’s secretly held opinions (De legibus, 3.15.33-38). 
 
2. Reason and right action. A partnership also serves as a framework for defining the parameters of 
legitimate action. The consent (consensus) that makes partnerships possible connects back to an 
earlier part of Cicero’s definition of a res publica (also Cicero, De republica, 1.25.40: partnership 
formed by mutual agreement). Societas for Cicero is premised on the ius naturale that arises from 
“natural reason among all men.”64 In this context, natural reason basically means an ability to cal-
culate interest and recognize fairness (see Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, 1.8.2; Sallust, Bellum Cati-
linae, 44.5). Without the former, there can be no mutuality of agreement, but only obedience (like 
a child or slave) to stated conditions. Without the latter, the agreement becomes nothing more 
than the fleeting arrangements of a den of thieves prone to deception and violence (see De republi-
ca, 2.26.48; also De officiis, 1.10.31; 2.11.40: duty to restore trust and fulfill a promise; Philippics, 
2.3.5; 2.4.9). But reason limits the range of actions allowed in a partnership: one cannot be obligat-
ed to act contrary to morality (boni mores) (Gaius, Institutiones, 3.157); one cannot have one’s prop-
erty taken against one’s will (3.195); and one cannot reach an agreement to take someone else’s 
property.  
 
“Reason,” and I place the word in quotes because the discourse is itself about what counts as rea-
son, had powerful implications for validating the distribution of property, as well as for delegiti-
mating attempts at agrarian reform. For Cicero the violation of property is like a violation of natu-
ral law:  
 
For a man to take something from his neighbor and to profit by his neighbor’s loss is more con-
trary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our per-
                                                 
61 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 170. 
62 Ibid., 171; also Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 2007: 15-16, 26 fn. 30. 
63 Henrik Mouritsen, "The Incongruence of Power: The Roman Constitution in Theory and Practice" in A 
Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic, edited by D. Hammer, (Oxford and Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2015), 146-63, here 153-54. 
64 Gaius, Institutiones, 3.154; David Daube, "Societas as Consensual Contract" in The Cambridge Law Journal 6 (3) 
(1938): 381-403, here 385; also Cicero, De legibus, 1.13.35: societas iuris. 
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son or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship (societas) 
between man and man (De officiis, 3.5.21).  
 
Cicero draws out the conclusion: “For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal 
profit, will defraud or injure his neighbor, then those bonds of human society which are most in 
accord with Nature’s laws must of necessity be broken” (Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum 
quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum 
naturam, humani generis societatem) (De officiis, 3.5.21). Attempts to redistribute property, such as 
by Tiberius Gracchus, who introduced a law in 133 BCE to limit holdings of public land that have 
been taken illegally by the wealthy, become a violent abrogation of the partnership.65  
 
Cicero makes a comparison between efforts at land redistribution and laws entrusting the proper-
ty of an insane person to male relatives in that line. It would be no more “right” for the insane 
individual to possess the property as it would for an insane multitude (or the demagogue who 
assumes their name) to possess the property of the people (De republica, 3.33.45). Speaking against 
P. Servilius Rullus’ agrarian reform bill introduced at the beginning of Cicero’s consulship, Cicero 
plays on the idea of property and inheritance, asking if the people would not rather have the terri-
tory that belongs to the Roman people remain part of their patrimonio rather than divided up into 
private lots (Oratio de Lege Agraria contra Rullum, 2.29.79-80). The specter that Cicero raises, and it 
is powerful enough to enable him to marshal popular support against the measure, is that the 
Roman inheritance will be lost (Oratio de Lege Agraria contra Rullum, 2.30.82; 2.31.84; also De officiis. 
2.21.73; 2.22.78; 2.22.79 = theft; 2.23.83; 2.24.85; De republica, 1.44.68; recall Varro 1.1.2: wasted by 
gluttons).66  
 
3. Order. Finally, partnerships define the proper functioning of its parts. The norm of partnership 
is not the Greek homonoia, like-mindedness (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9.6.3; Plato, Republic, 
431d-432a; Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.7.11b P; 2.7.5l: shared belief about the goods of life), but concor-
dia and harmonia. Harmony, as in music, occurs from the “proportionate blending of unlike tones” 
(De republica, 2.43.69), so in a civitas, concord is produced by “agreement among dissimilar ele-
ments” (De republica, 2.43.69). More ominous is the suggestion that “the interruption or violation” 
of this harmony is “intolerable to trained ears” (De republica, 2.43.78). Something must prevent 
that violation, and that is the auctor who ensures the validity of legal transactions.67 Auctoritas is 
conventionally (and not incorrectly) defined as an influence that derives from respect for one’s 
words and actions as a model of wisdom and virtue (De republica, 2.9.15; 2.12.23; 2.28.50; also De 
                                                 
65 Drawing on the idea of ownership, the argument for land reform advanced by Tiberius was that the populus 
Romanus should be given what belongs to them (see Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics, 126-27). 
66 On Cicero’s responses to land reform generally, see Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics, 220-43. 
67 Richard Heinze, "Auctoritas" in Hermes 60 (3) (1929): 348-366, here 350-55; Agamben, State of Exception, 76-77; 
Hammer, Roman Political Thought, 52. 




officiis, 2.9.33). Auctoritas is derived from augere, which means to increase or grow, suggestive of 
how auctoritas is not tied to an office or specified powers but “grows on its own power.”68 It is a 
power that is both enacted, generating influence, and granted by others through their esteem for 
the individual.69 But it is not a power that has legal force or is binding on others.70  
Giving us insight into the relationship of auctoritas to societas, Heinze suggests that an auc-
tor was originally used in legal terminology to refer to a person who, because of his position as 
seller of something, is responsible for ensuring the validity of the legal transaction, or someone 
who, because of particular knowledge, is responsible for advice about the transaction.71 As we 
have seen, for Cicero the most important aspect of a relationship, including political relationships, 
is “truth and fidelity to promises and agreements” (De officiis, 1.7.23; 3.70). Auctoritas, for Cicero, 
answers to this concern by ensuring the bonds of trust and mutual accountability by which nego-
tiations can occur. The assurance is oriented both to the past, as contestations occur within a con-
text of precedents, rules, and procedures, and to the future by ensuring that new promises are 
kept and protections assured.  
 
This language of trust is significant. It is for Pettit a norm that reinforces non-domination.72 But 
trust is imprinted on the Roman imagination through a violent display that demonstrates dispro-
portionate power relations.73 Livy tells of the punishment of Mettius Fefetius for the violation of 
trust, which was a brutal tearing apart of his body so violent that the punishment (but not the 
memory) was henceforth forbidden (Livy 1.28.9-11). Such latent violence lies beneath societas. So, 
for example, state redistribution of property violates the basis of agreement (De officiis, 1.7.20; also 
3.5.21, 23). It destroys harmony (De officiis, 3.5.22), equity (De officiis, 2.23.83; 2.24.85), and the trust 
(fides) of a partnership (De officiis, 2.22.78, 79; 3.5.23-24; De officiis, 2.23.81-82). In effect, the actions 
dissolve the partnership (De republica, 3.33.45). As Cicero writes, making clear the relationship 
between trust and property, “For there is nothing that upholds a government more powerfully 
than its credit; and it can have no credit, unless the payment of debts is enforced by law” (De of-
ficiis, 2.24.84).  
                                                 
68 Michèle Lowrie, Writing, Performance, and Authority in Augustan Rome, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
286.  
69 See Karl Galinsky, Augustan Culture: An Interpretive Introduction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
12-13; Joy Connolly, The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 126-27; Michèle Lowrie, Writing, Performance, and Authority, 279-308.  
70 There is no Greek equivalent for auctoritas: Richard Heinze, Auctoritas, 363-64. Lowrie provides a helpful con-
trast to Greek translations of auctoritas, noting how the Greek cannot capture how the authority associated with 
auctoritas is derived from both agency and community (Michèle Lowrie, Writing, Performance, and Authority, 291). 
71 Richard Heinze, Auctoritas, 350-55. 
72 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 266, 
268. 
73 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 50 on display. 
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The breakdown of auctoritas is associated by Cicero with the loss of power to stabilize, or 
for Heinze, the inability to ensure the validity of negotiations of power. Cicero ties auctoritas back 
to the potestas of the people; absent the central role of auctoritas in giving context and continuity to 
those agreements, the public realm and the power of the people are unsustainable. But that aucto-
ritas would also define itself against the potestas of the people, particularly when that power was 
seen as a threat to the partnership (De republica, 3.33.45). The terms Cicero uses in talking about 
this violation of partnership is the language he employs against Catiline, equating the breakdown 
of trust with sedition and justifying the senatus consultum (Orationes in Catilinam, 1.10.25: furiosus; 
1.5.11: taeter; 4.6.13: immanis). The senatus consultum ultimum was a statement by the senate advis-
ing (though the senate has no ability to compel or invest power in) a magistrate to do what was 
necessary to protect the res publica. Seemingly a last ditch measure envisioned when the commu-
nity faces an emergency that is ultima necessitas (i.e., most extreme necessity), it was used on sev-
eral occasions: in 121 BCE to remove Gaius Gracchus from the protection of law, thus allowing for 
his assassination by Lucius Opimius, a private citizen (De oratore, 2.30.132; also 2.31.134; 2.39.164-
66; Orationes in Catilinam, 1.3; De officiis, 1.22.76; Brutus 212); in 100 BCE against the tribune Satur-
ninus (Orationes in Catilinam, 1.4); in 88 BCE against the tribune Sulpicius; in 77 BCE against the 
proconsul Lepidus; and most harmfully (for Cicero’s own career) to justify the execution of the 
Catilinarian conspirators without a public trial.74 The provision is incomprehensible from a consti-
tutional perspective: nowhere established by law, not enforceable by the senate that decreed it, its 
effect is to suspend law.75 And its use was contested. But the reasons given in defense become 
more explicable from the perspective of societas: it is not a claim of legality but “for the mainte-
nance of the fatherland” (patriae conservandae) (Cicero, De oratore 2.31.134, trans. modified).  
 
I have sought to explore how the res publica was organized not as a constitutional system, but by 
forms of knowledge and disciplinary practices that underlaid rather than emanated from gov-
ernmental institutions. I do not count myself among classical scholars who reject Foucault’s work 
as historically untenable. There are limitations. His writings evince a tendency to view ancient 
authority by way of the figure of the sovereign: as magical, powerful, and able to suspend law 
and exact vengeance.76 And owing perhaps to the scope of his work, Foucault tends to group an-
cient societies together, reading Greek and Roman works as an unbroken discourse, whether in 
talking about sovereignty, the care of the self, or parrhêsia (which Foucault translates as libertas in 
a Roman context, though containing a very different resonance). But the Republic is a puzzling 
case: The elites are the subjects, but not the sovereigns, of Republican historiography. It is by way 
                                                 
74 On the use of the senatus consultum ultimum, see Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics, 200-20.  
75 On the difficulties of understanding the decree by way of constitutional principles, see Andrew Lintott, The 
Constitution of the Roman Republic, 89-93; Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception. 
76 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 48-53; also Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 48: vengeance; Foucault, Society, 66-8: 
luster of glory and force. 




of Foucault, though, that I have sought to suggest some of the logic by which the res publica was 
made comprehensible. I have located this ratio of Roman government in the idea of ownership, 
which is seen as providing the condition for the existence of the community. Where the res is not a 
common possession — whether held by a tyrant or a faction — there is no res publica (Cicero, De 
republica, 3.31.43). But how the res publica is known normalizes and rationalizes forms of domina-
tion. Where ownership distinguishes the civis from the slave, it is also within ownership that a 
system of differentiation is organized, objectives defined, disparities of power normalized, and 
the distribution of power institutionalized. 
 
Neo-Romanism, liberty and power 
I want to end by pointing to the implications of this ratio for neo-Roman interpretations of Roman 
politics; interpretations that view the Roman legacy by way of its early modern, republican reviv-
als. Although starting from similar claims—that the res publica is conceptually different from the 
sovereign state and that citizenship is built around notions of ownership—the neo-Roman con-
ception of power still operates in the shadow of the Leviathan. Hobbes signaled a new type of 
power that was concentrated and unified in the fictional entity of the state and exercised over a 
defined territory.77 Accompanying the sovereign state for Hobbes was a redefinition of liberty as 
non-interference in which one was free to the extent that the state provides particular protections 
or guarantees. Before that, the neo-Romans argue, liberty was conceived as non-domination: not 
as a protection from the state, but as a legal status defined in relationship to slavery. What makes 
someone a slave for the Romans, Skinner writes, is that they are “made into the property of 
someone else.”78 The difference between being free and a slave, between owning and being 
owned, and similarly of whether a community is free, is whether they are sui iuris, that is, under 
their own jurisdiction.79 There is no higher authority that provides rights, but “a state of civic in-
dependence” in which one can live “a free way of life, unconstrained by any unjust dependence 
or servitude.”80 Reading Rome through the lens of sovereignty has implications for the conception 
                                                 
 77 Quentin Skinner "The State" in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, edited by T. Ball, J. Farr and R. 
Hanson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 90-131, here 123-25; Quentin Skinner, "A Genealogy of 
the Modern State" Proceedings of the British Academy, 162 ( 2009), 325-70, here 341, 354-55 
(https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264584.003.0011). 
78 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39. 
79 Gaius, Institutiones, 1.48; also Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 40-41, 44-45; Quentin Skinner, "A Third 
Concept of Liberty" in Proceedings of the British Academy 117 (2002): 237-68, here 249. I have argued elsewhere that 
the juxtaposition of being free to being a slave is not only confined to a Roman tradition, but also articulated 
prominently by the Greeks (Dean Hammer, "Thinking Comparatively About Participatory Communities" in A 
Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic, edited by Dean Hammer (Oxford and Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2015), 503-19. I would note, as well, that the Romans did not understand power only by way of the 
dichotomy of imperium, which Pettit understands as public power, and dominium. 
80 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, 17. 
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of the operation of power in the res publica. Absent the Leviathan, the Roman Republican tradition 
appears as anti-power81 or non-domination.82 It is a community that is not conceived as having an 
existence apart from the sum of the people who populate it. 
 
Pettit recognizes that laws have some coercion, though “laws create people’s freedom” by pro-
tecting them “against the resources or dominium of those who would otherwise have arbitrary 
power over them.”83 Arbitrariness — which takes on a not entirely consistent sense of both capri-
ciousness and of actions without reference to the “avowable interests” of the individual affect-
ed—is juxtaposed to lawfulness.84 Skinner notes that “if a state or commonwealth is to count as 
free, the laws that govern it — the rules that regulate its bodily movements — must be enacted 
with the consent of all its citizens, the members of the body politic as a whole.”85 These protec-
tions occur not only in the Roman constitutional arrangements,86 but also by way of such intangi-
ble norms as “mutual reliance and trust,” which derive from and contribute to “freedom as non-
domination”87 as well as representing “a means of regulating those in power.”88  
 
It is hard to imagine what Rome is being described: it does not appear to be the Rome in which 
the votes of the wealthier simply counted as more, an unelected senate effectively set the political 
agenda and could suspend law, a political and religious system excluded entire groups from ac-
cess to power, and an economic system condemned increasing numbers of society to landlessness 
and debt. In part, I raise these issues to suggest a certain mythologizing of this Roman past in 
neo-Roman interpretations, which has implications for how we reconstruct this Roman past as 
well as what aspects of this past get imported into a constitutional concept of Rome. Urbinati has 
already suggested that one sees in neo-Roman normative theory an “echo” of the Roman re-
sistance to equality.89 I am pointing to a slightly different, though related, aspect of neo-Roman 
approaches; namely, to their language of non-coercion, non-arbitrariness, non-domination, and 
                                                 
81 Philip Pettit, "Freedom as Antipower" in Ethics 106 (3) (1996): 576-604.  
82 Philip Pettit, Republicanismm, 20, 27-28, 36, 283-84, 298. 
83 Ibid., 36. 
84 Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 138-39; also Pettit, Republicanism, 55. On the ambiguity of Pettit’s notion of arbitrariness, see Patchen 
Markell, "The Insufficiency of Non-Domination" in Political Theory 36 (1) (2008): 9-36, here 13-16. 
85 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 27. Pettit argues for contestability rather than consent as a basis for 
non-arbitrariness (Pettit, Republicanism, 184-85). 
86 Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 284; Quentin Skinner, A Third Concept of Liberty, 262. 
87 Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 266, 268. 
88 Ibid., 268. 
89 Nadia Urbinati, "Competing for Liberty: The Republican Critique of Democracy" in American Political Science 
Review 106, (2012): 607-621, here 614. 




consent.90 Where Foucault is helpful is not just in alerting us to different sites of domination, but 
also in exploring how these forms of domination are normalized; how something that is arbitrary, 
for example, is seen as non-arbitrary. While one aspect of domination occurs in the opposition 
between owning and being owned, other forms of domination are normalized within the context 
of ownership.  
 
The issue is not that Pettit and others ignore structural inequalities. The problem is that they de-
fine power only along one dimension, namely as domination (either imperium, public domination, 
or dominium, private domination)91 understood largely in agent-centered and institutional terms 
as power that is held and applied to another.92 That is, it is exactly the conception of power that 
Foucault is critiquing as incomplete. What the interpretation is not able to account for — and this 
is significant given the importance of the mos maiorum in Roman political life — is how social 
power operates. An illuminating example is Pettit’s discussion of norms, including norms of trust, 
as supplementing freedom as non-domination.93 But norms are aspects of power that do not have 
obvious agents and are not recognizable by way of a dichotomy of owner/owned. Norms privi-
lege particular conduct, validate particular forms of knowledge, and sanction particular institu-
tions that, from any perspective outside those norms, are arbitrary. We have seen, for example, 
how trust was integral to the Roman political system, enforced by memories of violence, prem-
ised on particular relations of power, and how it served as the justification for actual violence un-
der the guise of the abrogation of trust.  
 
The notion of trust for both the Romans and neo-Romans is not simply an informal norm; it is a 
metaphor that defines a particular relationship between the people and rulers. Pettit includes 
Locke in this Roman tradition because he employs trust as a legal metaphor in which rulers act on 
behalf of the people.94 As Pettit writes, “The idea that government is a sort of legal trust—the idea 
that government is a more or less well-defined brief to which the rulers have to remain faithful—
goes with the further idea that the people are entitled to challenge the government about how far 
and how well it is discharging this trust.”95 Pettit sees the sovereignty of the people as lying in 
responding rather than choosing, and in contestability rather than electoral authorization.96  
 
                                                 
90 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 27 employs the idea of consent. Philip Pettit argues for contestability 
rather than consent as a basis for non-arbitrariness (Pettit, Republicanism, 184-85). 
91 Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 13, 130; Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 152. 
92 For example, Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 284; Philip Pettit, Freedom as Antipower, 578: “the dominating party 
will always be an agent.” 
93 Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 241. 
94 Ibid., 40, 202. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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At the core of the idea of contestability is a Roman legacy of anti-majoritarianism that gets im-
ported into neo-Roman normative theory. The neo-Roman concern with arbitrary imposition is as 
much about the actions of the many as of the few. As Pettit argues, non-domination requires that 
one avoid a system in which laws are “subject to excessively easy, majoritarian change.”97 It is an 
idea of contestability, as Urbinati writes, that is focused on “stopping, checking, and impeding 
rather than legislating, reforming and ruling.”98 What is off limits in a trust, like in a societas, are 
attacks on private property. Pettit describes one appeal of liberty as non-domination, making it 
“easier to support the introduction or reinforcement of private property.”99 Although protections 
of private property “would require the non-dominating interference of the state,” it would “more 
than compensate by increasing the extent of such undominated choices in other respects.”100 In 
contrast, the ideal of non-interference “does not make the argument for institutions of private 
property so straightforward,” since it may allow for interference by the state if that makes it pos-
sible “in a great measure” for people to avoid interference.101 Sounding like Scipio in De republica 
and Cicero against land reform, Pettit writes: “Let the laws be subject to ready majoritarian 
amendment, then, and the laws will lend themselves to more or less arbitrary control; they will 
cease to represent a secure guarantee against domination by government.”102  
 
But we have good historical evidence from the Republic of how these sorts of anti-majoritarian 
procedures entrench inequalities and prevent communities from addressing systemic concerns (in 
the case of Rome, agrarian reform). Pettit tries to get around this problem, suggesting that identi-
fying arbitrariness and domination is a “political matter,” but one that is “not essentially value-
laden.”103 Trying both to advocate contestability and carefully confine it, Pettit talks about the 
need for jurisprudence to identify “good law” and to create procedures that somehow recognize 
good challenges from bad ones.104 So who is it that decides what good law is or what counts as a 
good challenge? Is it the optimates? Or the populares? Is it the tribunes, the assembly, or the senate? 
And if the procedures are themselves the problem, by what procedure does one challenge them? 
For if there is one thing that the Roman Republican past teaches us, it is that “good” does not ad-
                                                 
97 Ibid., 180. 
98 Nadia Urbinati, Competing for Liberty, 615. 
99 Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 135. 
100 Ibid., 135. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., 181. Similarly, see Skinner’s disassociation of freedom from “collective control over the common life” 
(Quentin Skinner, A Third Concept of Liberty, 242; also Quentin Skinner, "Rethinking Political Liberty" in History 
Workshop Journal 61 (2006): 156-70; Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, 741, fn. 38). 
103 Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 56. 
104 Ibid., 181. On contestability, ibid., 63. Pettit at times moves toward a claim of arbitrariness that acts against an 
individual’s interests and desires, but then takes another step in suggesting that those interests and desires must 
be “common” and “avowable” (Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 181; Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 156-58). We 
end up with a disembodied universality and rationality of beliefs. 




mit of obvious or impartial criteria, since these notions are themselves outcomes of social pow-
er.105 
 
The Roman liberty that Pettit celebrates is the outcome of the normalizing discourse of domina-
tion. It is the ratio that is abstracted from history: the fierce, extra-constitutional actions that not 
only confront the hidden forms of domination that lie within the system, but also expand in-
volvement in the system (which is a notion of liberty that is different from liberty as non-
domination).106 The emergence of the civis — in fact, the emergence of the subjectivity by which 
one even talks about liberty — is itself a history of domination and contestation. As Foucault 
writes in rejecting any notion of a universal, autonomous subject, “I am very skeptical of this view 
of the subject and very hostile to it. I believe, on the contrary, that the subject is constituted 
through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of 
liberty, as in Antiquity.”107 That is, libertas is not simply a state of legal being in which the free 
subject operates in a space of non-domination, but rather a practice both of resistance and the care 
of the self. The individual does not develop in a realm of anti-power; the individual “is an effect 
of power.”108  
 
Livy portrays the mass strikes of the plebeians in securing protections (Livy 2.23-24, 32-33; 3.52) 
as well as assertions of supremacy (Livy 2.7.7). In the surviving fragments of Sallust’s History, 
Macer, tribune to the plebs, links the manly deeds of the ancestors, which are akin to military vir-
tues, to the struggle to gain the tribunate for the commons, to open the magistracy to plebeians, 
and to gain the secret ballot (Historiae, 3.34.15, McGushin; also 3.34.1). Sallust’s language continu-
ally recalls images of an internal war against the populus: of gaining the state by arms (Bellum Cat. 
11.4); of citizens as victors turning on other citizens (Cat. 11.4); of the nobility as enemies turning 
on the commons (Jug. 31.3); of enslavement by one’s own people (Jug. 31.11; 31.20); of the surren-
                                                 
105 Along these lines, Markell notes in his discussion of Pettit, “Social power systematically oriented toward the 
development of certain agents' discursive capacities is not arbitrary in the first, minimal sense, because it is 
guided by something other than whim; and it evades scrutiny under the second, thicker sense of arbitrariness 
precisely because its exercise is represented as the very thing that converts an agent's own whims into legitimate 
interests” (Patchen Markell, The Insufficiency of Non-Domination, 23). 
106 See also Patchen Markell, The Insufficiency of Non-Domination, 26 who argues that Pettit’s concern with control 
and domination should be supplemented with a concern that goes back to the Republic with involvement and 
usurpation (as “world-narrowing”). 
107 Michel Foucault, "An Aesthetics of Existence" in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 
1977-1984, edited by L.D. Kritzman, (New York: Routledge, 1988), 48-53, here 50; also Foucault, The Subject and 
Power, 790. 
108 Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" in Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, edited 
by C. Gordon, 78-108 (Brighton: Harvester Press), 98. 
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der of sovereignty (Jug. 31.9); and of the commons as the vanquished (Jug. 42.4-5; Hist. 3.34.27).109 
Sallust characterizes the Gracchi as beginning “to assert the freedom of the commons and expose 
the crimes of the oligarchs” (Jug. 42.1). He announces the reason for writing The War with Jugurtha 
as “the first time resistance was offered to the insolence of the nobles” (Jug. 5.1). And he identifies 
the people’s jealous embrace of their liberty as checking the corruption and complicity of the no-
bility (Jug. 3.2-3).  
 
My interest here is not to challenge whether there is such a thing as liberty as non-domination. I 
am pointing to the complexity of interpreting the Roman tradition as the beginning point for a 
notion of libertas as non-domination. As important as libertas was in Roman self-reflection, and I 
think the meaning of libertas, itself, has a broader set of meanings than recognized in neo-Roman 
interpretations, the Roman case is as much a study of how forms of domination are normalized to 
appear as non-domination.110 Although in his work Foucault glosses the operation of power in the 
Republic, a Foucauldian study of the past alerts us to how the meaning of such words as “non-
arbitrary” and “non-domination” are historically constituted and constitutive of power. And it 
alerts us to how neo-Roman interpretations import this past — a past that itself suppresses its 
agonistic history by naturalizing power — to normalize and “discipline” particular political atti-
tudes and conduct: privileging equity over equality, order over participation, and authorization 
over initiation.111 Lost is the life of the Republic as a study of moments of liberation; not due to 
reasoned, deliberative discourse that counts as contestation, but through the unsettling types of 
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110  On the range of meanings of liberty, see Dean Hammer, Roman Political Thought and Dean Hammer, 
“Thinking Comparatively,” in Companion, edited by Dean Hammer. 
111 Philip Pettit, "Democracy, Electoral and Contestatory" in Nomos 42 (2000), 105-144, here 134. 
